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BALANCED EVIDENCE:
DISCRETION OF THE GATEKEEPER TO ADMIT PRIOR
CONVICTIONS AND ACTS
INTRODUCTION
This survey examines evidentiary issues concerning the Federal
Rules of Evidence 404(b), 413, 414, and 403 that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed during this survey period.' The survey focuses on
the manner in which the Tenth Circuit applied these Federal Rules of
Evidence to admit an array of evidence establishing the previous conduct
of defendants. Part I evaluates the Tenth Circuit's guidelines for district
courts admitting evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, and acts pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Part II outlines recent Tenth Circuit
cases that address the admissibility of evidence of prior child molestation
and sexual assaults pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.
Part III analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 if evidence has been offered for admission under Rule 404(b),
413, or 414 and evaluates the wide discretion awarded trial judges in
ultimately admitting or excluding evidence by balancing the probative
value of the evidence with its risk of unfair prejudice.
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)
A. Background
1. Definition
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)2 states that evidence of a defen-
dant's prior crimes, similar acts or wrongs is generally not admissible to
prove the defendant has a bad character or a predilection for committing
a particular act.' Such evidence is admissible, however, in order to prove
1. The Survey period begins August 1, 1998 and ends July 31, 1999.
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Id.
3. See id.
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motive, intent, knowledge, plan, preparation, identity, the absence of
mistake, or accident.4
2. Common Law History Prior to Codification
Rule 404(b) ensures that the prosecution does not introduce evi-
dence of a defendant's prior misconduct merely to demonstrate his pre-
disposition for particular acts or his general bad character. The United
States Supreme Court has discussed the historic prohibition against ad-
mitting evidence of a defendant's character to demonstrate conformity or
predilection.5 In Michelson v. United States,6 the Court stated
[t]he State may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, spe-
cific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such
facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad gen-
eral record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a par-
ticular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, de-
spite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its
disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.'
Although Michelson was decided well before the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Court's statement provides sound policy
reasons for excluding propensity evidence such as prior convictions and
bad acts. The Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the general prohibition
against admitting character evidence in the form of prior bad acts and
convictions; however, Rule 404(b) grants admission to such evidence if
8offered to prove intent, knowledge, and planning by the defendant.
3. Current U.S. Supreme Court Precedent for Rule 404(b)
In Huddleston v. United States,9 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth
four factors lower courts may consider in deciding whether to admit evi-
dence pursuant to Rule 404(b).' ° The Court outlined these factors to
demonstrate the sufficient protection that emanates from the Federal
4. See id.
5. See generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (discussing the
rationale behind the character evidence prohibition); Rule 414 discussion infra Part II (confronting
this historical prohibition and presents a presumption of guilt for defendants based on past acts that
demonstrate an individual's propensity to commit similar acts). Rule 414 effectively overturns the
historical prohibition in favor of public policy. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
6. 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948).
7. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted).
8. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
9. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
10. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,691-92 (1988).
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Rules of Evidence Articles IV and I against the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence." The four sources of such protection are:
first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be of-
fered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of
Rule 402 -- as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assess-
ment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether
the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially out-
weighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, and fourth, from Federal
Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court shall, upon
request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be consid-
ered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted."
Many circuit courts, including the Tenth Circuit, embraced the
Huddleston factors and readily evaluated evidence of prior similar acts
against the same four factors." Prior to Huddleston, the circuit courts
disagreed on "whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding
before 'similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the
"'14jury .... The Second and Sixth Circuits required the court to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the similar
act, while "the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the ad-
mission of similar act evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the
jury to find that the defendant committed the act."' 5 Alternatively, "[t]he
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits require the
government to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant committed the similar act."' 6 Huddleston addressed the
differences among the circuit courts and determined that protection from
unfair prejudice stems from analyzing such prejudicial evidence against
the four factors set forth above, rather than from preliminary findings by
the trial court.1
7
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Dozal
In United States v. Dozal,5 the Tenth Circuit held that although "the
district court should not have admitted testimony about the [defendant's]
1996 arrest," the admission was harmless. '9 A jury convicted Mr. Dozal
of "conspir[acy] to distribute cocaine . . . and possession with intent to
11. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689-9 1.
12. Id. at 691-92 (footnotes and citations omitted).
13. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998).
14. United States v. Manso-Portes, 867 F.2d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1989).
15. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685 n.2.
16. Id.
17. Seeid. at691.
18. 173 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 1999).
19. United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 795 (10th Cir. 1999).
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distribute."2 ° On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Dozal challenged the
admission of testimony by Michael Plunkett, an Oklahoma Highway
Patrol Officer.2' During trial, Officer Plunkett testified that on a previous
occasion he discovered several bundles of marijuana in a vehicle, in
which Mr. Dozal was a passenger."
The Tenth Circuit reviewed evidentiary issues involving Rule
404(b) for abuse of discretion and asked whether the trial court satisfied
the four requirements established in Huddleston.23 In Dozal, the Tenth
Circuit determined that the evidence of the defendant's prior involve-
ment with hidden contraband existing in a car in which he was just a
passenger was not offered to establish intent, motivation, or knowledge
24as required by Rule 404(b). Thus, the district court erred by not ex-
25
cluding this prior involvement. However, the court concluded that this
constituted harmless error because of other independent facts including
the thirty ounces of cocaine seized at the defendant's apartment.
26
2. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos
In United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos,27 the Tenth Circuit evaluated
whether the district court properly admitted evidence of prior acts pursu-
ant to Rule 404(b) according to the four requirements established in
Huddleston.2 The defendant, Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos, was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine after entering a United States
Border Patrol checkpoint where a Border Patrol Agent received "permis-
sion to walk a narcotics-detecting dog around the car., 29 The narcotics-
detecting dog alerted agents to the car's dash, windshield and fender ar-
20. Dozal, 173 F.3d at 791.
21. See id. at 794.
22. See id.
23. See United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 (10th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the four
Huddleston factors). The four requirements, which must be satisfied by the district court when
deciding whether evidence is admissible pursuant to 404(b), are:
(1) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must be introduced for a proper purpose;
(2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the court must make a Rule 403 determination
whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential
for unfair prejudice; and (4) the court, upon request, must instruct the jury that the
evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the limited purpose for which it was
admitted.
Id. (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)).
24. See Dozal, 173 F.3d at 795.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. 175 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1999).
28. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1999).
29. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 840.
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eas, where the agents subsequently discovered 4,467 grams of cocaine
within a concealed compartment in the car.30
The Tenth Circuit held the district court properly admitted the de-
fendant's prior arrest and guilty plea" for contraband to demonstrate his
knowledge of the concealed contraband of the currently charged crime."
This evidence demonstrated knowledge and intent because the prior ar-
rest for contraband involved marijuana and Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos as
the driver and registered owner of the car containing the concealed drugs
in altered compartments.33 The court upheld the district court's ruling
admitting this evidence because it demonstrated the defendant's knowl-
edge pursuant to Rule 404(b).34
3. United States v. Brooks
In United States v. Brooks,35 the Tenth Circuit again reaffirmed the
Huddleston factors in evaluating whether the district court abused its
discretion by admitting a monitored telephone conversation between the
36defendant and an undercover law enforcement agent. The defendant
contended the district court erred in admitting the testimony of the un-
dercover agent regarding a prior conversation with the defendant for the
37future sale of narcotics.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated the district court's Huddleston analysis
38in admitting the undercover agent's testimony and determined the court
did not abuse its discretion.3 9 The district court correctly concluded that
the testimony established the defendant's identity pursuant to Rule
404(b) and was relevant to lay the foundation for the time and place of
30. See id.
31. See id. at 845 n.8 ("Although the government charged Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos with felony
possession of marijuana, he plead guilty to misdemeanor possession.").
32. See id. at 846.
33. See id. at 845.
34. See id. at 845-46. As discussed in Part II, the Tenth Circuit also noted the district court's
implicit application of Rule 403.
35. 161 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
36. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1241-43 (10th Cir. 1998).
37. See Brooks, 161 F.3d at 1244.
38. See id. at 1243.
39. See id. at 1244; see also United States v. Collins, No. 90-266C, 1999 WL 641872, at *2
(10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of defendant's prior conviction for possession of crack cocaine after detailing the carefully
structured Huddleston analysis conducted by the district court). In Brooks, the Tenth Circuit
approved the admission of the tapes and testimony for the purpose of identity under the plain
language of 404(b) before evaluating and affirming the district court's Huddleston analysis. See
Brooks, 161 F.3d at 1243; see also United States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1998)
(establishing that testimony of law enforcement agents is properly admitted if offered to prove
identity). Therefore, testimony of law enforcement agents offered for the purpose of identity
pursuant to 404(b) is not necessarily subject to the Huddleston factors.
2000]
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the charged activities. 40 Additionally, the court held the trial record suffi-
ciently supported the district court's conclusion that the testimony was
not unfairly prejudicial.4' The Tenth Circuit also recognized the district
court's detailed cautionary instruction to the jury explaining the limited
purpose for admitting the evidence. 4' Thus, the Tenth Circuit evaluated
the district court's decision to admit the agent's testimony step-by-step in
accordance with the Huddleston factors.
C. Other Circuits
1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit differs slightly in the Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) requirements used to determine whether evidence of prior wrongs
and convictions is properly admitted. The Ninth Circuit originally for-
mulated a four-part test for the admission of evidence pursuant to 404(b)
Rule which required:
(1) proof that the defendant committed the other crime must be clear
and convincing; (2) the prior criminal conduct must not be too remote
in time from the commission of the crime charged; (3) the prior
criminal conduct must, in some cases, be similar to the offense
charged; and (4) the prior criminal conduct must be introduced to
prove an element of the charged offense that is a material issue in the
43
case.
Slightly different from the Huddleston factors, these factors do not
expressly provide for a Rule 40344 balancing test or for limiting instruc-
tions upon party request. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the U.S. Su-
preme Court's holding and four-part test outlined in Huddleston, yet the
Ninth Circuit asserted that Huddleston only altered the court's first origi-
nal requirement stated above.4 ' The court explained that the remaining
three factors of its previous four-part test remained unaffected by Hud-
46
dleston. Therefore, the court continued to use its 404(b) test after
changing the first part and temporarily adding a fifth element.47 The
Ninth Circuit test for 404(b) evidence replaced the above first factor to
state that "the evidence be sufficient 'to support a finding by the jury that
40. See Brooks, 161 F.3dat 1243.
41. Seeid. at 1244.
42. See id.
43. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. See also discussion infra Part Ill.
45. See United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1989).




the defendant committed the similar act.' 48 It also added a Rule 403
element which stated, "the probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ,,49Roughly seventeen
months later, however, the Ninth Circuit abandoned this additional 403
element.50
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has criteria similar to those of the Ninth
Circuit"1 for admitting evidence pertaining to prior convictions and simi-
lar acts, 2 and grants the district judge large deference in deciding to ad-
mit 404(b) evidence.53 Although the Seventh Circuit requires the district
court to "'undertake a principled exercise of discretion"' in conducting a
404(b) analysis when applying the circuit's four-part test,54 the court later
interpreted this principled exercise of discretion as granting district
judges wide discretion to admit 404(b) evidence.55 A Seventh Circuit
district judge's decision to admit or exclude prior similar act evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b), however, is analyzed in regards to the judge's
adherence to the circuit's four-part test. In United States v. Johnson," the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its requirement that the charged offense have
characteristics in common with the prior bad act.57 Additionally, the court
stated in Johnson that it is error to merely assume that "other drug of-




50. See United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497, 501 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Emenogha, I F.3d 473, 478 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating
how Huddleston altered the original requirements of the Seventh Circuit's 404(b) analysis which
required clear and convincing evidence rather than sufficient evidence).
52. The Seventh Circuit requirements include:
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the
other act is similar enough and close in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the
evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar
act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
United States v. Long, 86 F.3d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1996).
53. See United States v. Johnson, 137 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1998).
54. United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 621
(7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1987)).
55. See Emenogha, I F.3d at 478.
56. 137 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 1998).
57. See Johnson, 137 F.3d at 975.
58. Id. at 974.
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3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit continues to follow the two-part test set forth in
1978 in United States v. Beechum.59 This two-prong test first requires
that the court determine that "the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to
an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the evidence must
possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue
prejudice and must meet the other requirements of [R]ule 403. " 60 The
circuit acknowledged the Huddleston holding that the evidence be suffi-
cient in order for a jury to find the defendant committed the similar act
and interpreted that holding to require the first part of the circuit's test.
6 1
In United States v. Carrillo,6" the Fifth Circuit affirmed this two-part test
and required district courts to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis with a Rule
403 balancing test when deciding to admit evidence of prior offenses or
similar acts.63 In Carrillo, the Fifth Circuit described one of the excep-
tions to Rule 404(b)'s general bar against propensity or character evi-
dence. 64 The exception analyzed, named the "handiwork or signature• ,,65
exception, requires the government to prove the connection between
the defendant's prior similar acts and convictions with the current crime
to sufficiently establish the defendant's signature method of conducting
particular crimes. 66
4. Fourth Circuit
Finally, the Fourth Circuit interprets Rule 404(b) as an "'inclusive
rule" that allows admission of evidence of other acts relevant to an issue
at trial except that which proves only criminal disposition.' 68 The Fourth
Circuit utilized a three-part test in United States v. Rawle69 to evaluate
70
the admissibility of 404(b) evidence. In Rawle, the Fourth Circuit es-
tablished the admissibility of extrinsic acts if the evidence was (1) "rele-
59. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. See United States v. Bailey, Ill F.3d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997).
62. 981 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1993).
63. See United States v. Carrillo, 981 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1993).
64. See Carrillo, 981 F.2d at 775.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Although some commentators hold that all circuit courts follow the inclusionary approach
in interpreting Rule 404(b), many circuits do not clearly state that they follow this approach. See
Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
57, 61 n.23 (1995) (citing Dean Wigmore and Professor Stone). The net effect, however, of broad
judicial discretion and the varied exceptions provided under Rule 404(b) is to include rather than
exclude the majority of evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b).
68. United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990)).
69. 845 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1988).
70. See United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244,1247 (4th Cir. 1988).
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vant to an issue other than character;" 7 (2) "necessary, which means that
it [wa]s an essential part of the crimes on trial, or where it furnished part
of the context of the crime; and [(3)] reliable. 72 The court also mandated
that the evidence be subject to a Rule 403 analysis.73
The Fourth Circuit has not directly contrasted its three-part test with
the Huddleston test; yet the circuit appears to give greater deference to
district courts through its interpretation of Huddleston. In United States
v. McMillon,74 the Fourth Circuit quoted Huddleston in stating that
404(b) excludes evidence of prior acts that demonstrate the character of
the defendant unless the evidence "'bears upon a relevant issue in the
case such as motive, opportunity or knowledge. ' '7 5 Although this sum-
marizes the premise of Rule 404(b), the court interprets Rule 404(b) to
exclude certain prior act evidence only if offered solely to prove "crimi-
nal disposition. 76 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit may grant a district judge
a great deal of discretion in his admission of prior acts pursuant to




Although the circuit courts widely recognize the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Huddleston, many circuits chose to supplement their
existing 404(b) tests with that holding. The Tenth Circuit, in contrast to
the other circuits discussed above, adopted the Huddleston factors di-
rectly. The Huddleston factors represent only a guideline that courts may
choose to use in deciding to exclude certain propensity or character evi-
dence under the detailed exceptions to Rule 404's general prohibition of
such evidence. The net interpretation of Rule 404(b) by many circuits
tends to be inclusionary rather than exclusionary because circuit courts
will only reverse a trial judge's decision to admit certain 404(b) excep-
tion evidence for abuse of discretion.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 in 1994,
had the effect of superseding Rule 404(b)'s general prohibition of char-
acter or propensity evidence and gave district courts favorable legislative
support to rely on when choosing to admit the exact type of propensity
evidence 404(b) seeks to exclude. 7  The legislative history of Rules 413
and 414 offers a presumption in favor of admission of prior sexual mis-
71. Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247.
72. United States v. MeMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 955 (4th Cir. 1994); see Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247.
73. See McMillon, 14 F.3d at 955; see also discussion infra Part I1.
74. 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 954 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)).
76. Id.
77. See discussion infra Part II.
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conduct evidence in cases involving sexual assault or molestation to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to commit these crimes. Al-
though the legislative history also concedes this evidence is subject to
Rule 403 balancing tests,78 a district judge arguably has increased discre-
tion to admit the evidence. In such cases of sexual assault and molesta-
tion, district courts may give superficial weight to the Huddleston factors
for the admission of character or propensity evidence. In fact, the inclu-
sive interpretation of Rule 404(b) joined with a synopsis of the legisla-
tive history for Rules 413 and 414, as well as ample judicial discretion
for Rule 403 balancing tests, may ignite a trend to admit propensity or
character evidence under the veil of motive, plan, intent, knowledge, or
opportunity. A founding proponent of Federal Rules 413 and 414 stated,
"[the vagueness of the standards of Rule 404(b) ensures considerable
variation in [the] application [of current evidence rules] by the courts,
and this tendency is magnified in sex offense cases by the special pres-
sures courts have felt to find some way of getting the evidence in.71
2. Tenth Circuit
The Huddleston factors do not present any new requirements to
practitioners or judges for introducing evidence of prior acts. The factors
merely condense the fundamental requirements that the evidence must
meet within one test. Due to the recent Tenth Circuit precedent of evalu-
ating the district court's Huddleston analysis, prosecuting attorneys
within the Tenth Circuit should attempt to conform to all the Huddleston
factors to ensure success on subsequent appeals.
Similarly, defense attorneys may successfully rebut the introduction
of such propensity evidence by demonstrating the couft or prosecution's
78. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(stating the other standards of the rules of evidence continue to apply to the admission of evidence
pursuant to 413 and 414, including Rule 403); see also United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326,
1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that district courts must continue to weigh the probative value of
413 sexual assault evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice even considering the favorable
purpose of rule 413 towards admitting evidence). In Guardia, the Tenth Circuit provided factors
district courts may consider in weighing the probative value of particular 413 evidence including the
"similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, the closeness in time of the prior acts to the charged
acts, the frequency of the prior acts, the presence or lack of intervening events, and the need for
evidence beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim." Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit proceeded to affirm the district court's exclusion of witness testimony of the
defendant's former patients of prior sexual abuse by the defendant due to the danger for confusion of
the issues. See id. at 1332.
79. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1994). In this article, Karp cited to numerous state cases
where propensity or character evidence was admitted pursuant to similar state 404(b) evidence rules,
and alleged that the "creative use of the 'intent' exception and other categories has enabled some
courts to approximate a broad rule of admissibility for evidence of other similar crimes." Id. at 32-
35. This inclusive interpretation of 404(b) in conjunction with sexual assault or molestation evidence
may further broaden the interpretations of those state courts that employ evidence rules modeled
from the Federal Rules of Evidence but have yet to adopt the new Rules 413 through 415.
[Vol. 77:3
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failure to evaluate the proffered evidence under each of the Huddleston
factors. A failure to conduct a proper Rule 403 balancing test, the Tenth
Circuit's third factor, remains one of the strongest allies for defense at-
torneys in the Tenth Circuit. However, as demonstrated in Lazcano-
Villalobos, as long as the trial record sufficiently supports the 403 bal-
ancing test and outlines the proper purpose for admitting the prior acts
evidence, a district court's 404(b) ruling will likely remain undisturbed.
The Tenth Circuit has not expressed a preference for trial judges to state
on-the-record findings supporting each aspect of their Huddleston analy-
sis, but doing so would certainly minimize any questions regarding such
analysis on appeal.
II. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
A. Background
1. Definition
When accused of sexual assault or molestation, Federal Rules of
Evidence 4138' and 414" admit evidence that the defendant committed
80. See, e.g., Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1332 (noting the importance of "a reasoned, recorded
finding that the prejudicial value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative
value."); see also discussion infra Part II.
81. FED. R. EVID. 413 provides:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time
as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" means a crime
under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United
States Code) that involved...
Id.
82. FED. R. EvID. 414 provides:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time
as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "child" means a person below the age of
fourteen, and "offense of child molestation" means a crime under Federal law or the law
of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved...
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similar assault or molestation acts in the past. Therefore, Rules 413 and
414 are notable exceptions to the general historic rules prohibiting evi-
dence to demonstrate either conformity with the charged conduct or an
individual's propensity to commit the charged act as promulgated by
Rule 404.84
Federal Rule of Evidence 41515 accompanied the adoption of Rules
413 and 414 and together these rules promote the admission of evidence
of any sexual abuse, molestation or misconduct by the defendant for any
relevant purpose." Proponents of the Rules argued such evidence is nec-
essary because sex offenders tend to demonstrate a pattern in committing
such crimes, and these offenders have higher recidivism rates than other
Id.
83. See FED. R. EvID. 413 and 414.
84. FED. R. EVID. 404 provides:
Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of the accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of the victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence
of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Id.
85. FED. R. EVID. 415 provides:
Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party's
alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child
molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule 413
and Rule 414 of these rules.
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall disclose the evidence to
the party against whom it will be offered, including statements of witnesses or a summary
of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days
before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good
cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
Id.
86. FED. R. EvID. 413 advisory committee's note; 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
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criminal defendants." The evidence offered under these Rules may take
the form of prior convictions, similar specific instances or even testi-S 88
mony of previous allegations or uncharged actions. The proposal and
adoption of Rules 413 through 415 in 1994 was largely "in response to
the public's desire to put more power into the prosecution of sexual
predators. ' 9 Arguments that propensity evidence in sex crime cases is
necessary to counter the inherent problems posed by such cases also fu-
eled the adoption of these Rules. The problems include witness credibil-
ity, distinguishing sex offenders from upstanding citizens, and the poten-
tial for sex offenders to believe they pose no threat or are victims them-
selves.90
Following the 1994 proposal for these Rules, "Congress bypassed
the usual process by which Federal Rules of Evidence are
promulgated," 9' which requires a "proposal by the Advisory Committee,
a period of public debate and comment, Supreme Court adoption, and
finally, Congressional review and approval. 92 Instead, Congress deter-
mined the Rules "would become effective within 150 days after" the
Judicial Conference made recommendations on changes to the Rules.93 It
is perhaps not surprising Congress chose this procedural route in light of
the numerous committees that opposed the new Rules. The Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules,94 the Advisory Committees on Criminal
and Civil Rules,95 and members of the Standing and Advisory Commit-
tees96 all opposed adoption of Rules 413 through 415. The only remain-
87. See Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and
Child Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415?, 14 J. L. & POL. 153, 163,175-81 (1998) (contrasting the proponents' views with statistical
research and concluding: "the numbers, on the whole, do not indicate that sex offenders are social
deviants continually driven to repeat their crimes. Their recidivism rates are simply not significantly
greater than those of other criminals.").
88. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (stating "evidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible," thus testimony or prior uncharged assaults or
assaults for which the defendant was not convicted are admissible).
89. Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: "Laws are like Medicine;
They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser... Evil," 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1503, 1505 (1999).
90. See Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1729, 1742 (1999).
91. Aluise, supra note 87, at 159.
92. Aluise, supra note 87, at 159-60.
93. Aluise, supra note 87, at 160.
94. This Committee was unanimous in its objection to the new rules except for the dissenting
vote by the representative of the Department of Justice. See FED. R. EViD. 413 advisory committee's
note.
95. These committees also were unanimous in their opposition except for representatives of
the Department of Justice. See id.
96. See id. (noting the while it was an unusual occurrence for members to unanimously agree,
the members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, "composed of over 40 judges, practicing
lawyers, and academicians," all viewed the rules as undesirable).
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ing supporters of Rules 413 through 415 represented the Department of
Justice.97
The Standing Committee and Judicial Conference both opposed the
Rules as drafted and instead proposed amendments to existing Evidence
Rules 404 and 405 to incorporate the proposed policy goals.98 The Com-
mittee proposed an amendment to Rule 404 because it generally "gov-
erns the admissibility of character evidence.' '99 Whereas, Rule 405
amendments were sought "because the authorization of a new form of
character evidence in this rule has an impact on methods of proving
character that were not explicitly addressed by Congress. ' ' However,
Congress adopted the proposed Rules 413 through 415 as originally
drafted rather than amending Rules 404 and 405."°'
2. Opposition to Rules 413 through 415
The abounding opposition to the adoption of the Rules by various
committees underscores the vigorous debates surrounding their adoption
in the congressional arena as well as in academia. 0 2 Some of the oppo-
nents to Rules 413, 414, and 415 argue the Rules violate the due process
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and, so unfairly prejudice de-
fendants in the eyes of jurors, that emotions rather than facts of the
charged offense will render guilty verdicts.' 3
Opponents believe the Rules violate a defendant's constitutional
right to due process because admitting such evidence to demonstrate the
defendant's propensity to commit a crime runs an inherent risk of unfair
prejudice against the defendant.' °4 Hence, blanket acceptance towards
admitting evidence of prior sexual assault may cause a jury to render a
guilty verdict based on the defendant's propensity to commit the crime
rather than on the facts and evidence of the particular charged crime.'
Additionally, opponents argue the admission of this type of highly preju-
dicial evidence will substantially increase the risk "of convicting all




100. Id. (discussing the proposed changes for the new rules under FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(4)).
101. Id.
102. See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (1994); Sheft,
supra note 67; cf. Karp, supra note 79.
103. See Aluise, supra note 87, at 157; see also 139 CONG. REC. S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1993) (statement by Sen. Biden) (opposing the new rules because evidence of prior crime evidence
"tends to . . . blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an independent
judgment...").
104. See Duane, supra note 102, at 107-08.
105. See Duane, supra note 102, at 107-08.
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of sexual offenses in the past--regardless of whether those defendants are
guilty or innocent."'0 6
Opponents also charge that the existing evidence Rule 404(b) is
sufficient to admit evidence of past convictions or prior bad acts to dem-
onstrate pattern, knowledge, motive or intent, thus the Rules specific to
sexual offenses are unnecessary.' °7 Rule 404(b) sets forth numerous ex-
ceptions to the general prohibition to admitting character or propensity to
act, and, together with judicial discretion, these exceptions arguably pro-
vide sufficient opportunity to trial judges to admit evidence of prior sex-
ual offenses or uncharged misconduct.' °8
3. Proponents of the Rules
Proponents of the Rules defend them based upon public policy and
the assumption that it is unlikely a defendant with a rape conviction will
encounter the unfortunate circumstance of a false accusation for rape.109
Proponents argue the Rules help protect the public against repeat rapists
and sexual molesters due to the pattern these perpetrators develop with
each repeated assault on a new victim." ° Thus, evidence establishing the
pattern of a particular assailant and linking that pattern to the charged
defendant will ensure the accuracy of convictions."' Proponents for
Rules 413 and 414 also insist a defendant with "a history of rape or child
molestation stands on a different footing" from other defendants charged
with crimes such as theft or homicide.' A defendant's "past conduct
provides evidence that he has the combination of aggressive and sexual
impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes, that he lacks
106. Duane, supra note 102, at 107; see Sheft, supra note 67, at 76; cf Scott, supra note 90, at
1738-39 (discussing the opponent view to rules 413 and 414 as discrediting "the ability of jurors to
behave reasonably in evaluating evidence.").
107. See Duane, supra note 102, at 98-99; 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, § 190 at 801-803 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) (discussing the current trend for ample admission of evidence of similar prior acts or crimes
by the defendant that demonstrate "the handiwork of the accused" and the signature of the accused);
see generally, FED. R. EVID. 413 advisory committee's note (discussing the Judicial Conference
Committee's and Standing Committee's recommendation to amend rules 404 and 405 to provide the
same protections supported by the proposed rules):
108. See Fed. R. Evid. 404. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the
Debate over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense
Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1136 (1993) (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) precludes only one theory of admissibility, while allowing alternate purposes to admit
evidence of prior acts); Sheft, supra note 67, at 61-63 (noting numerous instances where evidence of
prior rapes or sexual assaults was admitted to demonstrate a "common scheme or plan", "intent", or
"absence of mistake").
109. See Duane, supra note 102, at 108.
110. Seeid.at98.
11. See id.
112. Karp, supra note 79, at 20; see 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari) (relying on the Karp article as an authoritative text discussing the
proposed rules and adopting the text as an authoritative part of the rules' legislative history).
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effective inhibitions against acting on these impulses, and that the risks
involved do not deter him.""' Additionally, the proponents support the
adoption of the Rules because safeguards remain such as the Rule 403
balancing test 14 to protect defendants from evidence that presents sub-
stantially unfair prejudice." The only substantial change in applying the
Rule 403 balancing test rests with the presumption in favor of admitting
the evidence of prior sexual offenses or allegations."
6
Proponents also believe the Rules are necessary because the existing
rules of evidence preclude juries from hearing evidence about a particu-
lar defendant's background that is "necessary to get rape convictions in
this country."' ' 7 Advocates for the Rules believe the established evidence
Rules 403 and 404(b) deprive juries of critical information necessary to
effectively protect the public from molesters and rapists."'
4. Jurisdictional Arguments
Another argument surrounding the new Rules suggests they dispro-
portionately target Native Americans. Typically state courts have juris-
diction over defendants charged with sex crimes, however, Native
Americans residing on reservation land are subject to federal
jurisdiction."9 Consequently, there currently exist a disproportionate
number of rape and molestation cases involving Native Americans in the
federal courts. Native Americans accused of sexual offenses on reserva-
tions will therefore be subjected to the effect of Rules 413, 414, and 415,
while similar defendants in state courts may only be subjected to Rules
403 and 404(b), unless the state has adopted the new Rules. 20 The Tenth
Circuit recently addressed this jurisdictional objection in United States v.
McHorse.12 The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that
Rule 414 violated his Fifth Amendment equal protection rights22 "be-
113. Karp, supra note 79, at 20.
114. See discussion infra Part inI.
115. See Duane, supra note 102, at 103.
116. See Duane, supra note 102, at 103.
117. 140 CONG. REC. H5439-01, at H5440 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
118. See Duane, supra note 102, at 99-100.
119. See Duane, supra note 102, at 114; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241 and 2242.
120. See Scott, supra note 90, at 1765 (citing three states that have adopted versions of rules
413-415 for their state's rules of evidence. The three states are Arizona, California and Indiana).
Although many states have not adopted versions of the rules, some state courts have "adopted
special common-law rules that admit evidence of prior similar crimes." Scott, supra note 90, at
1770.
121. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 897 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1998).
122. See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883 (stating "[a]lthough there is no Equal Protection Clause in
the Fifth Amendment, the equal protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment are incorporated
into the Fifth Amendment's promise of due process.").
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cause federal sex crime prosecutions are disproportionately targeted at
Native Americans:', 23 The court held the defendant's objection failed
because the defendant offered no evidence establishing a discriminatory
nature of Rule 414. 
1
4
5. Tenth Circuit Precedent
"The Tenth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to analyze
whether the Rules were constitutional."'25 In United States v. Enjady,1'
discussed in Part III, the Tenth Circuit held Rule 413 did not violate the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. 
2
1
The court in Enjady also affirmed that Rule 413 is subject to a Rule 403
balancing test, and therefore does not subject the defendant to funda-
mental unfairness. 2 In United States v. Castillo,129 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the constitutionality of Rule 414. In Castillo, the court acknowl-
edged that the Rule departed from the general bar to propensity or pro-
clivity evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b); however, the court held this
Rule did not violate a defendant's due process and was constitutional. 30
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the historical precedent of ad-
mitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct evidence, noting rules in
various jurisdictions admitting evidence demonstrating incest and "lust-
ful disposition."'' 3' The court conceded that the historical precedent of
various jurisdictions for admitting evidence of a defendant's sexual pro-
pensity is at best ambiguous. However, the court determined this am-
biguity favored the government.133 The circuit also reaffirmed its holding
in Enjady that the district court must continue to conduct a Rule 403 bal-
ancing test prior to admitting any evidence pursuant to Rule 414.134
123. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 897.
124. See id.
125. Scott, supra note 87, at 1748.
126. 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).
127. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-33 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
202 (1998).
128. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433; see also related discussion infra Part III.
129. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule 414 is
constitutional if evidence of previous sexual molestation is subjected to the balancing test
promulgated by Rule 403).
131. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 881.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 884.
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. McHorse
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit faced new challenges to
Rule 414 in United States v. McHorse"' In McHorse, the Tenth Circuit
confirmed that Rule 414 superseded all the restrictive aspects of Rule
404(b) in sex offense crimes"' and reaffirmed that its holding in Castillo
foreclosed any argument that Rule 414 "is unconstitutional on its face."'' 37
The defendant in McHorse argued that Rule 414 was a violation of due
process, but was unclear whether he challenged the rule "on its face or as
applied."'38 Therefore, based on the its holding in Castillo, the Tenth
Circuit construed it as an "as applied" challenge, subject to de novo re-
view. "9
A jury convicted the defendant of "four counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child less than twelve years of age .... and one count of abu-
sive sexual contact with a child less than twelve years of age."' 4 On ap-
peal, the defendant asserted that the district court erred in admitting his
niece's testimony accusing him of uncharged sexual molestation on pre-
141
vious occasions.
In addressing the defendant's several assertions of error relating to
the testimony of his nieces, the Tenth Circuit held the defendant's due
process rights were not violated.14 The Tenth Circuit determined the
district court's recurring instructions to the jury that the evidence of un-
charged sexual abuse was insufficient to prove defendant's, guilt and that
defendant was "'not on trial for any act, conduct, or offense not charged
in the indictment," were sufficient to protect the defendant's due process
rights. 1
43
The Tenth Circuit also reaffirmed a three-prong test the circuit es-
tablished to determine whether the district court may exercise its discre-
tion to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 414(a) or Rule 413(a). 44 In
135. 179 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 1999).
136. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir. 1999).
137. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 896. (noting that in Castillo the court held that "'that Rule 414 does
not on its face violate the Due Process Clause"').
138. Id.
139. See id. ("When reviewing a trial courts decision to admit Rule 414 evidence for
constitutional error, the appellate court must engage in a case-specific inquiry only, asking whether
the evidence in the case was so prejudicial in the context of the proceeding as a whole that the
defendant was deprived of the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of due process.").
140. Id. at 894.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 897.
143. Id. at 896-97.
144. See id. at 898 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 414(a)). FED. R. EvID. 413(a) is practically identical
to FED. R. EVID. 414(a) except FED. R. EvID. 413(a) governs sexual assault rather than molestation.
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United States v. Guardia, 145 the court established the three-prong test that
sets forth three requirements that must be satisfied "'before the district
court may exercise its discretion to admit' evidence of prior sexual mis-
conduct."' 46 First, the district court "must determine that the defendant 'is
accused of an offense of child molestation.",147 Second, the district court
must decide the evidence offered is evidence of other sexual molestation
offenses.141 "Third, the court must determine that the proffered evidence
is relevant."' 149 The Tenth Circuit also reaffirmed the Castillo holding
requiring the district court to make an explicit and reasoned determina-
tion of whether the probative value of the 414(a) character evidence is
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice towards the defendant
pursuant to Rule 403."0
2. United States v. Charley
In United States v. Charley,5' the prosecution charged the defendant
for the sexual molestation of his nieces.5 2 The government introduced
several witnesses who discussed the defendant's prior conviction for
sexual molestation, the medical conditions and evaluations of the defen-
dant's two nieces, and many of these witnesses specifically addressed the
sexual molestation of the girls."'
On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's admission
of prior conviction evidence as unconstitutional and "so prejudicial that it
denied him his due process right to a fair trial."' The Tenth Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the defen-
dant's prior sexual abuse conviction pursuant to Rules 403 and 414(a).
The court noted that the district court sufficiently explained its rationale
with on-the-record findings that the strong public interest in admitting
evidence pursuant to Rule 414 was exceptionally probative, and served
145. 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
146. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 897-98.
147. Id. at 898 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 414(a)).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 899.
151. On May 7, 1999, thus during the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v.
Charley. See 176 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). The defendant-appellant then petitioned the court for
rehearing, "with suggestion for rehearing en banc." United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1255
(10th Cir. 1999). Although the panel that rendered the first decision denied the defendant's petition,
a majority of the panel voted to amend the original opinion. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1255.
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit withdrew the original majority decision, and substituted a new
opinion issued on August 27, 1999. Id. Although the court issued the second opinion after the
present survey period, the following discussion will focus on the later opinion, as the court
substituted the later opinion for the opinion originally issued during the survey period.
152. See Charley at 1255-56.
153. See id. at 1260-70.
154. Id. at 1259.
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the function of corroborating the testimony of witnesses (often child vic-
tims) whose credibility is often sharply attacked on cross-examination.'
The defendant also contended the trial court erred in admitting the
expert testimony by the prosecution's witnesses. 16 The Tenth Circuit
acknowledged the district court erroneously admitted portions of the
testimony; however, the admissions were harmless.57 In its evaluation of
the admission of the contested witness testimony, the court discussed the
Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, and applied
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 702 relating to expert testimony.
159
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court affirmed the various factors de-
veloped in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,16 which dis-
trict courts may use to assess the reliability of particular methodologies
utilized by expert witnesses. 16 The Court's decision in Kumho Tire de-
clared that the basic gate keeping obligation set forth in Daubert applied
to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony as previously inter-
preted. 6' Further, the Court held that when appropriate, as determined on
a case-by-case basis, the specific factors set forth in Daubert may be
applied to expert testimony based upon either scientific foundations or
upon personal knowledge or experience. 16' The Court concluded that "the
trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case
how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reli-
able... [and] should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
155. See id. at 1260; see also United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1434 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the frequency of witnesses to testify effectively during sex offense prosecution due to the
traumatic effect such event have on witnesses); Karp, supra note 79, at 21.
156. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1260.
157. See id. at 1270, 1272 (stating that "the errors in admitting portions of the testimony of Dr.
Omelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms. Carlson did not affect a substantial right of a party .... Any errors in
the admission of evidence committed by the district court were harmless.").
158. 526 U.S. 137 (1999); see Charley, 189 F.3d at 1261 n. Il (noting that the trial court did not
have the benefit of direction from the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) in the analysis used to admit expert testimony relating to sexual
abuse of the defendant's nieces).
159. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1262-70.
160. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
161. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-52 (1999); see also Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593-94 (setting forth the factors as (1) "whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested." (2) "[W]hether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication." (3) The potential or known
rate of error should also be considered. (4) Finally, Frye's general acceptance theory can have some
bearing.).
162. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-50. In its discussion of the potential applicability of the
specific Daubert factors to varying types of expert testimony, the Court stated "[w]e can neither rule
out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, .
Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Id. at 150.
163. See id. at 150.
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where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testi-
mony.,,64
Although the Tenth Circuit discussed the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Kumho Tire, the court ultimately held that the district court
has great latitude in how it determines the reliability of expert testimony
and is not required to rely on the Daubert factors.16 This broad discretion
granted to the trial judge in how it makes its reliability determination
could result in the need for these judges to merely find some reliability in
the evaluation or methodology employed by the expert. 166 Arguably, the
Tenth Circuit implies that the mere indicia of reliability is sufficient to
admit expert testimony either discussing sexual molestation or assault
evidence, or offering conclusory opinions that sexual molestation or as-
sault occurred. 1
67
164. Id. at 152.
165. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261 n.l, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152) (holding "the abuse of discretion standard 'applies as much to the trial
court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion'"); see also Kinser
v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court's omission of an
expert's qualifications from the record is harmless error if the court of appeals can assess the
expert's qualifications from a sufficient trial record); United States v. Nichols 169 F.3d 1255, 1262
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "district courts have broad discretion in determining the competency
of expert witnesses" and that Rule 702 is not limited to scientific evidence but may also extend to
specialized knowledge).
166. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1266-67 (noting the broad discretion granted trial judges "in
evaluating the reliability of expert testimony."). Note however, that in its discussion of the
admissibility of Dr. Orelas' testimony, the court distinguished two types of testimony offered by
the pediatrician and held that: 1) the doctor's "generalized medical opinion" evidence that a history
of sexual abuse was not inconsistent with a normal examination was admissible; and 2) that Dr.
Ornelas' "unqualified opinion" that the girls were in fact sexually abused was inadmissible. Id. at
1267-68. While the basis of this "unqualified opinion" was not evident from the record, the court
held that it was inadmissible regardless of whether it was based on the girls' medical history, or
based upon crediting the girls' account of events. Id. at 1267-68. The court noted although subject
to Rule 702's reliability inquiry, no determination was made on the reliability of this unqualified
opinion, and noted that "if Dr. Ornelas' unqualified opinion was based on the girls' medical history,
there [wa]s insufficient support in this record for the district court's decision to admit it." Id. at
1266-67. Alternatively, if this unqualified opinion "was largely based on crediting the girls'
account .... she was essentially vouching for their truthfulness. In general, expert testimony which
does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and
exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact'
as required by Rule 702." Id. at 1267. The court also noted that if the trial judge had sustained the
defenses' objection to Dr. Ornelas' testimony on foundation grounds, then the government, and
court, could have more appropriately explored, and possibly established, the reliability of the
testimony. Id. at 1266-67. See also discussion infra Part II.D.3.
167. This broad discretion may have vast consequences in a district court's assessment of the
reliability and qualifications of expert testimony relating to prior charged and uncharged sexual
misconduct. Witnesses may be qualified as experts based on specialized knowledge and experience,
yet their methodologies and theories may be untested and inconsistent. Although district courts will
likely scrutinize these methodologies and theories for reliability, the district court may risk admitting
certain expert testimony and rely on the jury to weigh its credibility. Thus, the broad discretion
granted to district courts in admitting expert testimony may further liberalize the admissibility of
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C. Other Circuits
1. Generally
Other circuits have provided even wider discretion to district courts
for admitting evidence pursuant to Rules 413 or 414. In United States v.Z - 68
LeCompte, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
grant the defendant's motion in limine to suppress evidence of prior un-r- 169
charged sexual offenses. The district court granted the motion based on
the unfair prejudice such evidence would produce against the defendant
pursuant to a Rule 403 balancing test.7 ' The Eighth Circuit reversed
stating, "[i]n light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of
prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible, we think the Dis-
trict Court erred in its assessment that the probative value of T.T.'s tes-
timony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.""' Additionally, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the strong pre-
sumption in favor of admissibility of evidence of sexual molestation or
assault, quoting the legislative history of Rules 413 through 415, that
'[t]he new rules will supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).'"
72
The Second Circuit in United States v. Larson,'73 also demonstrates
the broad discretion awarded district courts for admitting evidence pur-
evidence under Rules 413 and 414, thereby possibly creating an automatic presumption of guilt for
the defendant to contest. See also discussion infra Part II.D.3.
Although decided after the survey period, in United States v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit addressed
the admissibility of testimony related to patterns of sexual abuse pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 413.
See United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1143 (10th Cir. 1999). Roberts, a tribal official for the
Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, was charged with several counts of sexually abusive contact. See
Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1128. One of the contentions on appeal concerned the testimony of several
women regarding the defendant's pattern of sexual abuse. Id. at 1141. Most of these women "were
not the victims of [the] charged offenses," yet they testified about abusive sexual contacts that
likewise allegedly occurred during employment with the defendant. Id.
The Tenth Circuit held that pursuant to Rule 404(b), the district court properly admitted the
testimony of six of the seven women to demonstrate a common pattern or "scheme of sexually
abusive behavior committed against female employees" by the defendant. Id. at 1142. Therefore,
even though evidence of prior charged and uncharged sexual misconduct is broadly admissible under
Rule 413, the Tenth Circuit scrutinized the admissibility of the women's testimony under Rules
404(b) and 403 rather than relying solely on Rule 413. See id. at 1141-42. Additionally, the Court
reaffirmed the use of the Huddleston factors to ensure the proper admission of Rule 404(b) evidence.
See id. at 1141-42; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988); Huddleston
factors supra Part I.
168. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
169. See United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997).
170. See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. 118992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari)).
173. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997); see also infra Part III.
suant to Rules 413 and 414.174 In Larson, the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged the opposition of several committees to the enactment of Rules
413 and 414, including the opposition of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee. 75 This group feared that the Rules would practically mandate the
"admission of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct," thereby admitting
highly prejudicial evidence without a proper Rule 403 balancing test and
potentially denying the defendant his Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights. 6 Although the Second Circuit recognized the potential for Rule
414 to admit evidence automatically, the court did not establish any
precedent requiring a Rule 403 balancing test or limiting the admission
of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct. 77 Rather the court in Larson
acknowledged the district court conducted a Rule 403 test and evaluated
the evidence under both 404(b) and 414, thereby ensuring the prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value.78
D. Analysis
1. Discretion
District courts have great discretion in weighing the probative value
of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. However, when a
Circuit Court of Appeals determines a district court abused its discretion
in excluding evidence pursuant to Rule 413 or 414, such as in United
States v. LeCompte, 179 the message communicated demonstrates the clear
preference for admitting evidence of prior charged and uncharged acts of
sexual molestation and assault.
2. Deference to Congress
It currently appears that courts largely defer to the legislative history
of Rules 413 and 414, which state the importance of admitting prior sex-
ual misconduct evidence, rather than critically evaluating the specific
factual circumstances before the court. District courts may also liberally
admit evidence of prior sexual offenses to conform to the Rules' legisla-
tive intent to supersede the restrictive aspects of Rule 404(b). Due to the
heavy reliance on the policy surrounding the Rules, district courts may
only give a cursory glance to the potential unfair prejudice weighing on
the defendant.
Although case precedent holds that the admission of sexual offense
evidence pursuant to Rules 413 and 414 is subject to all other evidence
rules including Rule 403, courts may weigh the policy behind the Rules
174. See United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
175. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 604.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 604-05.
178. See id.
179. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
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more significantly than the effect suffered by the defendant from the
admission of such evidence. As discussed below, although the Tenth
Circuit has adopted the Enjady8° factors to guide district courts in bal-
ancing sexual assault and molestation evidence, other circuits have yet to
adopt such factors. Therefore, district courts conducting 403 balancing
tests in other circuits may choose to follow the Enjady factors or other
methods to scrutinize 413 and 414 evidence and ensure the defendant's
due process rights are not disregarded. Though the presumption in favor
of admission for sexual misconduct evidence will continue, the adoption
of the Enjady factors or other guidelines will minimize judicial discretion
for admitting particular sexual offense evidence and provide predictable
precedent to practitioners.
3. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit continues to be the most active circuit in ad-
dressing evidentiary appeals for Rules 413 and 414. Defense attorneys
should recognize the overwhelming precedent within the Tenth Circuit
for affirming a district court's decision to admit evidence of prior sexual
offense evidence. There is recent precedent, however, in United States v.
Guardia'18 that may aid a defense attorney attempting to exclude certain
sexual misconduct evidence. In Guardia, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to exclude testimony by several patients of the
defendant regarding prior sexual abuse during gynecological
procedures. The district court excluded such probative evidence after
subjecting the proffered evidence to a Rule 403 analysis and concluding
the evidence would confuse and mislead the jury."' The court analyzed
and affirmed the district court's ruling because it was clear that for each
patient's testimony, expert witnesses would be required to explain the
appropriate medical examinations and procedures.' 4 Therefore, if de-
fense attorneys can successfully demonstrate that admission of prior sex-
ual misconduct by a defendant would necessitate mini-trials for such
evidence, the attorney may succeed in excluding such evidence.
The Tenth Circuit has yet to state whether district judges should
explicitly detail their decisions to admit or exclude 413 and 414 evi-
dence. In Guardia, the district court clearly outlined its Rule 403 bal-
ancing concerns during the defendant's motion in limine, thereby con-
forming to the circuit's preference for explicit 403 balancing tests. s5
Other circuits, however, are unclear on whether or not the district courts
180. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998); see also discussion infra Part
III.
181. 135 F.3d 1326 (l0th Cir. 1998).
182. See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1998).
183. See Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1332.
184. See id. at 1332.
185. See id. at 1331; see also discussion infra Part III.
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must explicitly express reasons for admitting certain sexual misconduct
evidence.
In prosecuting a sexual assault or molestation case, the Tenth Cir-
cuit seems to grant broad deference to expert testimony establishing the
evidentiary factors present in a particular case demonstrating sexual mo-
lestation or assault. Therefore, prosecuting attorneys may succeed in the
introduction of expert testimony offering conclusory opinions that sexual
misconduct occurred. Currently, insufficient reliability may be a proper
objection for defense attorneys to expert testimony demonstrating the
existence of sexual molestation or assault. However, such an objection
may offer the platform to the. prosecution to further establish the reliabil-
ity of such testimony and the particular methodology utilized.
III. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
A. Background
1. Overview of the Policy Behind Rule 403
Federal Rule of Evidence 403186 grants trial judges wide discretion
in determining whether the probative value of certain evidence substan-
tially outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice against the
defendant."' The preliminary draft for Rule 403 was bifurcated between
section (a) that mandated exclusion of certain evidence based on three
dangers and section (b) that provided discretionary exclusion of evidence
based on three considerations. 8 According to this preliminary draft,
judges were required to exclude evidence under section (a) if the proba-
tive value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, . . . confusion of the issues, or . . . misleading the
jury."'8 9 Whereas judges had discretion to exclude evidence when the
probative value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by con-
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."' 9
The early controversy surrounding the adoption of Rule 403 arose
from the fear of granting too much or too little discretion to trial judges.
Members of the Justice Department and the Senate objected to the bifur-
cation of Rule 403 because it would have erased much of the trial court's
186. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
187. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REV. 413, 441-42 (1989).
188. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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discretion to admit or exclude evidence. 9' On the other hand, those who
feared broad discretion believed that if a judge was not bound by rules
then his personal interests and beliefs might influence his decisions. t92
Others believed wide discretion would cause judges to refuse to think
through challenging evidentiary issues and simply exclude the disputed
evidence pursuant to Rule 403. Objection also arose over the proposed
Rule's failure to provide guidance to trial courts, particularly when none
of the dangers enumerated in parts (a) or (b) independently "substantially
outweigh the probative value of proffered evidence but taken together
they do."' 19 4 The Justice Department and the allied members of the Senate
ultimately succeeded in discarding the proposed bifurcated Rule 403 in
favor of the current 403, approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.' 95 The
predominant policy reason for the adoption of the final Rule 403 was to
"regularize and channel the use of discretion in the administration of the
rules of evidence. ,,196
Rule 403, as adopted, eliminated the proposed requirement that
judges must exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues," or "misleading the jury.' Instead, the Rule granted judges
broad discretion to act as gatekeepers, examining the evidence and
weighing its probative value against the dangers listed in section (a) of
the preliminary draft and the considerations listed in section (b) of the
preliminary draft. "9 However, the three dangers, especially the danger of
unfair prejudice, remains more significant to trial judges in exercising
their discretion under Rule 403 because certain evidence has the potential
to invoke emotional or rash responses in jurors that may influence their
decisions regarding a defendant's guilt or innocence. 199
The danger of 'unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 is not simply the
tendency of evidence to undermine a party's position. Rather, the
prejudice that is 'unfair' is prejudice arising from the tendency of
proffered evidence to suggest to the jury that it should render its
191. See id. § 5211, at 245 n.9.
192. See id. § 5212, at 252-54 n.12.
193. See id. at 254.
194. Id. at 245-46 n.9.
195. See id. at 245-47.
196. Id. § 5212, at 250.
197. Id. § 5215, at 273.
198. FED. R. EVID. 403.
199. See id. § 5215, at 273-75; FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (stating "'Unfair
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.").
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findings 'on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.
200
This concern for protecting against substantially unfair prejudice is not
focused solely upon evidence brought against a defendant; a judge must
similarly evaluate any evidence the defendant wishes to introduce incul-
201
pating another individual or in general under Rule 403.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified one aspect of the appli-
cation of Rule 403 in Old Chief v. United States."' In Old Chief, the
Court addressed the issue of whether "a trial court abuses its discretion
when, in a prosecution for possession of a handgun by a felon, it admits
evidence of the name or nature of the defendant's prior conviction de-
spite the defendant's offer to stipulate to his or her felon status."2 3 The
Court determined the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
204prior conviction evidence in lieu of the defendant's stipulation. Al-
though the Court outlined a clear application of Rule 403 in the specific
201circumstances of Old Chief, the Court has repeatedly declined to pro-
vide "detailed guidance as to the proper application of the rule" in gen-
eral .206
2. Tenth Circuit Precedent Employing Rule 403
In the past, the Tenth Circuit has given district courts broad discre-
tion in conducting balancing tests of the probative value and the prejudi-
201cial value of evidence. In March 1998, however, the Tenth Circuit sup-
plemented this ample discretion by setting forth several guiding factors
to aid district courts in balancing the probative and prejudicial worth of
evidence in cases involving sexual assault.2°8 The Tenth Circuit estab-
200. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing the FED. R. EVID.
403 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules)).
201. See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1188-92.
202. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
203. The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REV. 360, 360 (1997).
204. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1996
Term: Leading Cases, supra note 203, at 360.
205. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182, 185-86 (discussing a four-step approach to 403 analysis in
similar cases: step one discusses the prejudice presented by felon in possession charges; step two
sets forth a two-step analysis for weighing unfair prejudice with probative value; step three examines
the prejudice and probative value of the names and nature of particular offenses; and step four
addresses the potential for stipulation to felony status); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading
Cases, supra note 203, at 362-63.
206. • The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 203, at 360.
207. See United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
208. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
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lished these guiding factors in United States v. Enjady2 °9 and courts in the
Tenth Circuit have proceeded to name the factors the "Enjady factors."21
The defendant in Enjady appealed his jury conviction, claiming the
trial judge made a prejudicial error in permitting the admission of testi-
mony regarding a prior rape defendant allegedly committed. 2 " Both the
defendant and the witness testifying about the alleged rape were mem-
212
bers of the Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe. The witness, "A," testified
to drinking throughout the day with the defendant and several other indi-
viduals on the reservation.2 11 "A" asserted that she either fell asleep or
passed out and awoke to find the defendant raping her.1 4 She later re-
ported the rape to the authorities and medical personnel examined her."1 5
After his arrest for rape, the defendant admitted they had sex but argued
it was consensual . 6
The district court determined "that the testimony of the prior rape
was relevant," and admitted the evidence to show the defendant's pro-
pensity towards committing sexual assaults and to rebut the defendant's
claim that he would not perform this type of act."' The Tenth Circuit
determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence because the trial record and facts supported the district court's
ruling. 28 The Tenth Circuit recognized that although the evidence is ad-
missible under Rule 413, the district court must still undertake a 403
balancing test to justify admission of the evidence in conjunction with
Rule 413."' The Enjady factors for conducting 403 balancing tests for
sexual offense evidence are:
1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the
evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seri-
ously disputed the material fact is; and 4) whether the government
209. 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating "[w]e find
that the district court properly applied the Enjady factors and explained adequately the basis for its
decision to admit [the witness's] testimony."); United States v. Castillo, No. 98-2191, 1999 WL
569054, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (stating "[olur review of the record demonstrates that the
court clearly considered and applied the Enjady factors.").
211. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1429. This evidence invokes Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which
admits any prior charged or uncharged sexual assault evidence. For a more detailed analysis of Rule
413, see the discussion supra Part II.




216. See id. (stating that the defendant was only arrested for the rape and not convicted).
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1434.
219. See id. (addressing the particular procedural facts in Enjady, the district judge admitted the
evidence only after defense counsel raised the consent defense and the government introduced
evidence of the defendant's statement that he would never do such at thing).
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can avail itself of any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing the
probative dangers, a court considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence
will contribute to an improperly- based jury verdict; 2) the extent to
which such evidence will distract the jury from the central issues of
the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to prove the prior con-
duct.22 °
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Overview
During the Survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed the Enjady factors as well as the district court's discretionary
authority in balancing the probative value with the risk of prejudice.
Though the district judge retains large discretion in admitting evidence,
the Tenth Circuit also established its preference for district courts to ex-
plicitly outline Rule 403 balancing tests and conclusions."'
2. United States v. McHorse
222
In United States v. McHorse, the Tenth Circuit established that the
Enjady factors provide an on-the-record account of whether the probative
value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice in cases of sexual abuse.22 The defendant in McHorse was
charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child less than twelve years
old and one count for "abusive sexual contact with a child less than
224twelve years" old. On appeal, the defendant asserted the district court
abused its discretion in permitting testimony of prior sexual abuse be-. • 225
cause of its substantial risk for unfair prejudice. The court concluded
that the defendant's assertion that the district court abused its discretion
lacked merit because the district judge made on-the-record determina-
tions explaining his admissions and exclusions of certain testimony.
226
3. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos
227
In United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, the Enjady factors were
not precisely applicable because the case did not involve a sexual of-
fense; however, the case demonstrated the Tenth's Circuit's preference
for on-the-record Rule 403 balancing tests by district courts. Mr.
Lazcano-Villalobos, the defendant, was charged with transporting co-
220. ld. at 1433.
221. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
222. 179 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 1999).
223. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1999).
224. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 894.
225. See id. at 898.
226. See id. at 899.
227. 175 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1999).
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caine and cash across state borders. Over the defense's 403 objection,
the prosecution introduced a prior arrest of the defendant for hiding
marijuana in his rear bumper to demonstrate the knowledge and intent of
the defendant for the current charge.2 9 Although these facts also invoke a
Rule 404(b) analysis because the prosecution offered the evidence to
establish intent and knowledge,23 ° the Tenth Circuit held a Rule 403 bal-
ancing test is required for all relevant evidence offered pursuant to
404(b)."'
In Lazcano-Villalobos, the district court granted the government's
motion pursuant to Rule 404(b), to admit evidence of the defendant's
prior arrest and guilty plea to the marijuana possession charge. 32 The
admission of this evidence bolstered the government's charge that the
defendant had knowledge of concealed compartments in a car because
the prior arrest for possession also involved concealed car compartments.
The defendant objected to the admission of this prior arrest and guilty
plea evidence because its unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its
233probative value .
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit the
disputed evidence. According to the Tenth Circuit, the district court
must have implicitly balanced the unfair prejudice and probative value
because the court admitted the evidence over the defendant's Rule 403
234objection. The court concluded that the district court's implicit 403
balancing test was sufficiently supported by the trial record. 235 Through
accepting an implicit balancing in this particular case, the Tenth Circuit
court restated its preference for on-the-record, explicit, Rule 403 bal-
236ancing tests.
4. United States v. McVeigh
237In United States v. McVeigh, the Tenth Circuit again reaffirmed its
238
preference for explicit Rule 403 balancing tests. In McVeigh, the Tenth
Circuit expanded this preference and established that if a district court
fails to conduct on-the-record balancing tests, the Tenth Circuit will re-
view the record and conduct a de novo balancing test to uphold the dis-
228. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 840 (10th Cir. 1999).
229. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 844, n.4.
230. See supra Part 1.
231. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 845-46.
232. See id. at 845.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 847.
235. See id.; see also United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding a
district court's evidentiary ruling may be upheld "on any ground supported by the record").
236. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 847.
237. 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
238. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998).
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triet court's admission of certain evidence. In McVeigh, the Tenth Cir-
cuit instituted de novo review "because the record contain[ed] a colloquy
between the court and counsel that shed[] considerable light on how the
district court viewed the evidence."24 The Tenth Circuit, however, stated
it has yet to find "a per se abuse of discretion simply because a trial court
failed to make" an on-the-record determination for admitting or exclud-
241ing evidence pursuant to Rule 403.
C. Other Circuit Cases
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has not enumerated particular factors district
courts may consider when deciding whether to admit sexual assault or
molestation evidence pursuant to Rule 403. The Second Circuit, how-
ever, demonstrated a preference for admitting such evidence unless the• 242
prejudice against the defendant is substantial. In United States v. Lar-
son,243 the Second Circuit confirmed the broad discretion granted to dis-
trict judges in balancing the probative value and unfair prejudice of evi-
dence. The Court acknowledged this broad discretion when it affirmed
the district court's decision to admit evidence of a sexual molestation• 244
that occurred sixteen to twenty years earlier.
In choosing to affirm the admission of this evidence, the court relied
heavily on the legislative history of Rule 414; however, the court made it
clear that Rule 414 did not eliminate the application of other evidentiary
rules such as Rule 403 or applicable hearsay rules. 245 The court also ac-
knowledged the congressional intent in adopting Rule 414 to provide
flexibility to trial judges faced with deciding what prior charged or un-
charged sexual molestation evidence to admit.2' Therefore, when decid-
ing to admit evidence of sexual assault or molestation, Second Circuit
courts may defer to the legislative history of Rules 413 and 414 when
conducting Rule 403 balancing tests to support their admission of such
probative, yet highly-prejudicial, evidence. Larson was the first case in
the Second Circuit to decide that Rule 414 evidence may be excluded by
the trial court because of a Rule 403 balancing test determining the unfair
prejudice presented by such evidence which substantially outweighs its
239. See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1189.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
243. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
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probative value. The court did not expressly state whether on-the-record
403 balancing tests are required to admit 414 evidence.247
2. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has adopted a variation of the precedent adhered
to by the Tenth Circuit for determining whether evidence was subjected
to a Rule 403 balancing test. The Third Circuit's balancing test com-
pares "the 'genuine need for the challenged evidence and balance[s] that
necessity against the risk that the information will influence the jury to
convict on improper grounds.' 2 49 The Third Circuit also may examine
the trial record and conduct a de novo Rule 403 balancing test where "the
district court fails to explain its grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection
and its reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the
record.
,250
The Third Circuit in United States v. Sriyuth held that if the Rule
403 balancing test determines the danger of unfair prejudice presented by
the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, the trial court
252has discretion to exclude certain evidence. The court also asserted that
the jury is capable of compartmentalizing evidence of sexual assaults and
considering the evidence for the narrow purpose of demonstrating the
defendant's motive or intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)."'
Therefore, the Third Circuit will likely admit sexual misconduct evi-
dence to demonstrate a defendant's motive or intent or for the express
purpose promulgated by Rules 413 and 414. The Third Circuit's prece-
dent also favors the admission of such sexual offense evidence unless the
record fails to support the district court's 403 ruling.
247. See id.; see generally Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174 F.3d 261, 269 n.I I (2d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that district courts are "not required to articulate the relevant considerations on the
record" for a 403 balancing analysis and that a mere "sustained" or "overruled" will suffice); United
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court's 403 analysis will
only be called into question upon a showing that it acted arbitrarily and "[tlo avoid acting arbitrarily,
the district court must make a 'conscientious assessment' of whether unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value").
248. See United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996).
249. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 747-48 (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988)); cf. United States v. Pileggi, No. 97-CR-612-2, 1998 WL
288283, at *I (E.D. Pa., June 3, 1998) (noting that the factors to be considered in balancing test are:
"'the actual need for that evidence in view of the contested issues and the other evidence available to
the [party seeking admission], and the strength of the evidence in proving the issue, against the
danger that the jury will be inflamed ... ' (quoting Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 748).
250. United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994).
251. 98 F.3d 739 (3d Cir. 1996).





The Eighth Circuit relies heavily upon the legislative history of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 when deciding to admit evidence of
254prior sexual misconduct. In United States v. LeCompte, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion in
limine requesting the exclusion of evidence of prior uncharged sexual• 255
molestation accusations. In reversing the district court, the court
stressed Congress' strong legislative intent that evidence of sexual mo-
lestation or assault "should ordinarily be admissible., 256 The court noted
that .by enacting Rules 413 through 415 Congress intended to override
the general inclination of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude evi-
dence demonstrating a defendant's propensity to commit a particular act
or crime. 257 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit explained that evidence of-
fered pursuant to Rule 414 is subject to a Rule 403 balancing test;
"[h]owever, Rule 403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended
effect. In United States v. Gilmore, the Eighth Circuit held that al-
though it is preferable for the district court to explicitly state such a Rule




By establishing a series of factors that a district judge should con-
sider in admitting sexual assault and molestation evidence, the Tenth
Circuit attempted to focus the discretion generally granted district judges
pursuant to Rule 403. The Tenth Circuit, however, continues to vest sub-
stantial discretion with the district court and rarely overturns a lower
court decision for lack of an explicit or evident Rule 403 balancing
254. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
255. See United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir. 1997).
256. LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. 730 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1984).
260. See United States v. Gilmore, 730 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1984),(holding that under the
circumstances of this case the 403 ruling "carries with it an implicit ruling that the standards have
been met"). The circumstances included the admission of evidence regarding recorded taped
conversations during a drug transaction and testimony of unrecorded yet monitored conversations
and the subsequent unrecorded bench discussion at trial surrounding the admissibility of this
evidence. See also United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988) (following Eighth
Circuit precedent in holding that 403 balancing tests do not require an explicit ruling by the trial
judge); United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1455-56 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (holding that 403 on-
the-record analysis is required for prior convictions admitted for purposes of impeachment pursuant
to rule 609, however, such explicit rulings are not required for admitting 404(b) evidence of prior
similar acts).
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test.26 ' The Tenth Circuit cases during the survey period demonstrate the
circuit's strong preference for explicit Rule 403 findings. Yet, this pref-
erence will not force the reversal of an evidentiary issue for abuse of
discretion merely because the trial court failed to conduct an explicit test.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit may now conduct a de novo balancing
262test based on the trial record.
Recently, sexual assault and molestation cases before the Tenth Cir-
cuit presented numerous pieces of evidence demonstrating a defendant's
prior similar acts, or prior charged and uncharged sexual misconduct
pursuant to Rules 404(b), 413, and 414. Historically, federal courts
barred character or propensity evidence from admission; however, Rules
413 and 414 have altered that precedent. Today, practitioners in Tenth
Circuit courts should raise 403 objections to the introduction of such
evidence with the knowledge that such evidence will likely gain admis-
sion.
However, the Tenth Circuit has excluded such evidence in narrow
261circumstances. In United States v. Guardia, the district court excluded
evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct by the defendant because
the Rule 403 analysis determined that the evidence posed a substantial• 264
risk of confusion for the jurors. Therefore, Tenth Circuit district courts
may exclude evidence of prior sexual misconduct if a defendant success-
fully demonstrates that the confusion of issues or unfair prejudice ex-
ceeds the evidence's probative value. The Enjady factors may also help
practitioners defend accused sexual offenders by providing specific fac-
261. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 should be used infrequently, reflecting Congress'
legislative judgment that the evidence 'normally' should be admitted." See also United States v.
Blanco-Rodriguez, No. 98-2116, 1999 WL 100905, at *6 (10th Cir. March 1, 1999) (holding that
testimony regarding prior acts was sufficiently similar and close enough in time to the charged act,
and that the district court's failure to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test did not so prejudice the
defendant as to require a reversal): United States v. Mixon, No. 98-3004, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
14832, at *12, *15-*16 (10th Cir. June 29, 1999) (holding the testimony of a police lieutenant
regarding his involvement with a prior conviction with the defendant was erroneously admitted into
evidence constituting an abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court. However this admission was
harmless error because there was "sufficient independent circumstantial evidence of [diefendant's
guilt to overcome the erroneous admission of the prior conviction evidence.").
262. Cf United States v. Castillo, No. 98-2191, 1999 WL 569054, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 4,
1999) (evaluating a previous remand to the district court to explain its reasoning in admitting
evidence pursuant to Rule 403). The Tenth Circuit in Castillo also affirmed the trial court's "'broad
discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential prejudicial effect[ I and
will be reversed only on a showing of abuse of that discretion."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997)). In Castillo, the district court admitted
testimony of three prior uncharged sexual abuses and held that because the testimony was short and
"fleeting in character" the unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value and
confusion would not result nor would passions be inflamed. See id. at *2.
263. 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
264. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1327 (10th Cir. 1998).
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tors district courts should consider before admitting evidence of prior
sexual misconduct.
The Tenth Circuit's preference for explicit Rule 403 balancing tests
implies that a district court's 403 ruling will remain undisturbed on ap-
peal if the district court provides an on-the-record rationale. However,
given the wide discretion granted district courts in conducting their Rule
403 balancing tests, it is unlikely a district court's 403 ruling will be re-
versed if there is some basis provided somewhere in the trial record.
2. Other Circuits
Other circuits have been reluctant to adopt enumerated factors such
as those set forth in Enjady, possibly demonstrating a broad consensus in
favor of admission of sexual assault and molestation evidence pursuant
265to Rules 413 and 414 respectively. Although certiorari was denied to
the Enjady case by the U.S. Supreme Court, it would not be surprising if
this issue is considered by the U.S. Supreme Court after more circuits
implement this type of big brother advice and guidance to lower courts.
Circuit courts analyzing cases involving sexual assault or molestation
may begin to encounter a greater number of district courts admitting evi-
dence of prior similar acts in addition to prior sexual misconduct evi-
dence to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to conduct certain crimes.
The reasons for admitting evidence of prior similar acts may be beyond
the exceptions provided in Rule 404(b), such as motive, plan, knowledge,
and intent as district courts may admit the prior act evidence to demon-
strate the defendant's propensity to commit the charged sexual offense.
This potential increase in the number of district courts admitting such
evidence may derive from the increased opportunities district courts will
have to apply Rules 413 and 414, and the fact that most circuits employ
the same Rule 403 balancing standards for both evidence of prior sexual
assault and molestation as for prior bad acts. Therefore, district courts
may blur the contrary legislative purposes behind Rules 413 and 414266
and Rule 404(b).267
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit leads the circuit courts in establishing enumerated
factors that district courts may utilize in conducting Rule 403 balancing
tests for sexual misconduct evidence. The Tenth Circuit district courts,
however, may overwhelmingly choose to defer to the legislative history
265. See generally United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the "strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be
admissible"); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing the presumption
in favor of admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 413 and 414 in connection with the required
balancing test of 403).
266. See supra Part II.
267. See supra Part I.
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supporting Rules 413 and 414 when deciding whether to admit evidence
of prior sexual molestation or assault by the defendant instead of relying
on the enumerated factors for Rule 403. Alternatively, to ensure evidence
of sexual misconduct is properly admitted, district courts may choose to
use the Enjady factors in conjunction with the Huddleston factors. Fur-
thermore, Tenth Circuit courts may extend the precedent established in
United States v. Charley, for the admissibility of expert testimony, and
liberally admit expert testimony addressing the defendant's prior sexual
misconduct following the strong legislative history encouraging courts to
admit such evidence.
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